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Abstract 
 
This study identifies the effects of the 1992 and subsequent CAP reforms on arable farmland price in 
Belgium. We first propose a brief literature review of studies identifying the determinants of farmland 
price. Afterwards, we use a panel data set to estimate a capitalization model of farmland price. We 
first show that the compensatory payments introduce by the 1992 CAP reform exert a positive effect 
on the arable farmland price in Belgium. We also identify a structural break in the land price equation 
after the adoption of the new support instruments as well as a regional break between Wallonia and 
Flanders.  
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The main objective of most agricultural support policies consists in rising farmers income. One of the 
major critics opposed to such policy is the weak efficiency of the income transfer. An important part 
of the income transferred to the agricultural sector leads to larger consumption of variable inputs and 
creates a rent that capitalizes into asset value. As a fixed factor, land is seen as very sensitive to this 
capitalization process.  
The rise of farmland value can be seen as favorable for an individual farm operator. Indeed, the 
land value plays a crucial role as collateral to obtain credits and determines the purchasing power of 
the farmer after retirement. However, that the benefits of the support are capitalized in farmland value 
rises some equity considerations. Because two thirds of Belgian farmland are cultivated by tenants, not 
land owners, an important part of the support is captured by non-operators. As inflated land values 
also  imply  inflated  land  rents,  this  type  of  policy  might  even  make  tenant  farmers  worse  off. 
Moreover, if a farm operator purchases farmland with the expected future supports already capitalized 
in its price, he does not fully benefit from the support. Those benefits are used to finance a more 
expensive  investment  (Barnard  et  al.,  2001).  Finally,  the  inflated  farmland  price  due  to  direct 
payments makes more difficult for a young farmer to start his own business.  
In this paper, we are interested in analyzing the effects of the 1992 and subsequent Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms on the price of arable farmland in Belgium. The adoption of the 
1992 reform  corresponds  to  a  strong  inflexion in  the CAP  support instruments.  Relying  on  price 
support  since  its  foundation,  the  CAP  progressively  switches  to  direct  payments  decoupled  from 
production. To understand the reasons of this significant change, we have to remember that the 1992 
CAP reform also corresponds to a particular moment of the trade negotiation: the ongoing Uruguay 
Round. For the first time agriculture was on the global trade agenda. Many specialists pointed out that 
the elements of the 1992 reform permitted to achieve an agreement at the Uruguay Round. Other 
announced objectives of the reform were to promote rural development and contain environmental 
problems. 
The adoption of the 1992 and subsequent reforms leads to a substantial cut of the price support but 
compensated  with  direct  payments.  For  cereal,  oilseed  and  protein  crops,  the  amount  of  direct 
payments depend upon the cultivated area. Depending on the extent of the subsidised area, the direct  
payments can be conditional to a set aside provision. For beef production, the pre-existing premiums 
per head of cattle are increased. However, these premiums are conditional to a limit density of cattle 
per hectare of fodder crops. There is also a ceiling on the number of cattle heads eligible for premium. 
We see that the reform induces a stronger link between the eligibility to the benefits of the agricultural 
support and the use of land. Moreover, it is relatively well established that the effect of agricultural 
support on the price of land is stronger in case of direct payments decoupled from production. As a   3
result, we can suspect that the CAP 1992 reform has caused a substantial change in the determinants of 
farmland price.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the arable farmland price in real term during the 1980-2001 period 
in Belgium. We can see that after a continuous decrease up to 1994, the evolution of farmland price 
tends to stabilize and then increase in the years following the 1992 CAP reform. During the 1995-2001 
period, the real price of arable land increases at a yearly average of about 3.8% in Belgium. Showing 
the evolution of the Belgian agricultural area, Figure 2 gives us another insight of the effect of the 
1992 CAP reform. We can observe a significant change in the evolution of the series during the period 
succeeding the reform. Although that movement does not correspond to farmland acquisition, it allows 
us to conclude that the main message of the reform was well understood by farmers and landowners. 
They anticipate that forthcoming agricultural support will be linked to the farmland use. Consequently, 
they are more rigorous in reporting their agricultural acreage.  
Figure 1 : Arable farmland price evolution 



























































































Source : Belgian National Institute of Statistics (NIS)  
 





































































































































Source : Belgian Agricultural Census, Belgian National Institute of Statistics (NIS) 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. The next section presents a brief literature review 
of studies identifying the determinants of farmland price. The following section discusses a theoretical 
model of farmland price formation. The fourth section presents the empirical model and the data used 
in the empirical analysis. The fifth section presents and interprets the results of the empirical analysis.   4
We show that the compensatory payments exert a positive effect on arable farmland prices. We also 
show that the compensatory payments have a distinct effect each year and that the extent to which the 
agricultural support is capitalized into farmland value is region specific. The final section of the paper 
offers a summary and concluding remarks.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Most  research  attempting  to identify  and quantify  the determinants of farmland  price  rely  on  the 
capitalization approach. This approach assumes that the price of farmland equals the present value of 
all future expected cash flow attached to the use of land for productive purposes. In this context, an 
increasing  farmland  price  should  be  explained  by  an  increasing  land  rent.  In  USA,  agricultural 
economists observed that the evolutions of the real land value and agricultural income go in the same 
direction  from  1910  to  1950.  Those  trends  convince  agricultural  economics  to  rely  on  the 
capitalization  approach.  However,  a  divergent  evolution  of  land  value  and  agricultural  income  is 
observed since 1950. Because of the observed decreasing  agricultural income and increasing land 
price the classical model was rejected. Several alternatives hypothesis were proposed to explain the 
evolution of farmland price.  
Feldstein  (1980)  proposes  a  first  alternative  explanation.  He  points  out  that  the  increasing 
farmland price observed in the seventies took place during a period characterized by a strong inflation. 
Feldstein (1980) proposes a portfolio choice model with two assets: a classical financial asset and 
land. He shows that an anticipated inflation could lead to a decrease in the actualization rate applied to 
land and explain an increase in farmland price. Other authors explain that as a real asset with fixed 
supply,  land  tends  to  hold  its  real  value  during  inflationary  periods.  Consequently,  there  is  an 
inflationary  hedging motive  to  buy land during  an  inflationary period  (Castle  et al.,  1982). Most 
studies attempting to evaluate the effect of inflation on farmland prices found an insignificant effect. 
Alston (1986) shows that the inflation has a significant but negative effect on farmland price. On the 
basis of this result, Feldstein’s hypothesis is rejected.  
For  Melichar  (1979),  the  diverging  trends  of  agricultural  income  and  farmland  price  cannot 
conduct to reject the basic capitalization model. First, we need to consider that the net farm income 
usually used as a measure of the return to land is an inappropriate indicator. The net farm income 
corresponds to the return to land but also the return to farm labor and management. The land rent is the 
net farm income left after subtracting the return to farm labor and management. Second, the share of 
each type of remuneration in the net farm income cannot be considered as constant through time. 
During the second half of the twenty century, the capital-labor substitution phenomenon leads to an 
increase in the share of capital and, consequently, land in the net farm income and a decrease in the 
share of farm labor. Consequently, it is possible to reconcile both a decrease in the net farm income 
and an increase in the land rent explaining an increase in land value. Following Melichar’s arguments, 
Alston (1986) shows that between 1962 and 1982 the periods characterized by an increasing land 
value are also characterized by an increasing land rent. Moreover, the rate of growth of the land rent 
and the rate of growth of land value are never statistically different.   
 A number of studies have attempted to estimate the extent to which support policies increase 
farmland price. Most of those studies investigate the relationship between the benefits of agricultural 
supports and the value of land using the present value approach. In the land market, the participants 
accept to pay a higher price as long as they expect to yield a larger stream of cash flow. The subsidies 
aimed to support the agricultural sector increase the cash flows attached to the property of farmland. 
Consequently, the agricultural support also increases the land value. In what follow, we present the 
most  significant  studies  attempting  to  provide  a  quantitative  estimate  of  the  extent  to  which 
government payments are capitalized in farmland value.  
Goodwin  et  al.  (1992)  estimate  an  empirical  model  relating  land  value  to  expected  level  of 
producer support, expected yield and expected producer prices net of government support in six wheat 
producing regions between 1979 and 1989. The government support is proxy by the producer subsidy 
equivalent. This study shows that a one percent increase in the producer subsidy equivalent increases 
land value by 0.38%.    
Barnard et al. (1997) regress the cropland value on government subsidies and other characteristics 
like agricultural productivity, non-agricultural influence and state-specific institutional environments.    5
In their study, government payments are measured by the county-level averages of the annual amount 
of direct payments received par acre.  The authors carry the same analysis for twenty U.S. regions. 
They show that the elasticity of cropland value to the government subsidies ranges from 0 to 0.69 
according to the region. This study also points out that the sensibility of farmland value to government 
support is spatially variable. Two elements can explain this spatial variability; 1) whether or not the 
dominant crops in a given region are eligible to the support, and 2) the level of agronomic flexibility 
of a given region that determines the ability to adjust output in response to changing government 
policy.  
Goodwin  et  al.  (2005)  use  farm  level  data  to  estimate  the  capitalization  rate  of  government 
payments  into  farmland  value.  They  first  note  that  the  formation  of  land  value  is  based  upon 
expectations about the long-run stream of returns attached to land. Assuming that the realization of a 
particular source of return correctly reflects what is expected in the long run could lead to an error in 
variable  problem.  Error  in  variable  problem  results  in  inconsistent  estimators.  To  represent  the 
expected payment, the authors use a four-year average value of the realized payments at the county 
level. They first consider the aggregation of all support programs into a single category. They show 
that using the actual realized payment of each farm as proxy of the expected rent gives a coefficient of 
5.40. With the county average, they obtain a coefficient of 6.09. They conclude that “ the use of the 
farm observed payments may result in an attenuation bias that forces the implied capitalization rates 
toward zero”. Because the four-year county average of the payments is more representative of the 
long run benefits, a larger coefficient is obtained. They also show that the rate of capitalization of one 
dollar of payment is program specific. Breaking out the overall measure of government payments into 
their  individual  components,  they  find  a  specific  rate  of  capitalization  for  each  type  of  support 
program. Like Barnard et al. (1997),  Goodwin et al. (2003) show that the extent to which support 
policies affect land value is spatially variable. They also point out that the implied effect of a support 
instrument on land value differs from year to year.  
Clark et al. (1993a) point out a condition for the present value model to hold. The time series of 
rent  and  land  values  must  be  integer  of  the  same  order  for  the  series  of  the  rent  to  explain  the 
movement in farmland value. Campbell et al. (1987) rigorously demonstrate that for the present value 
model to hold it is necessary that time series of land prices and expected rents are cointegrated. On the 
basis of this condition, Clark et al. (1993b) show that farm incomes alone cannot explain land values. 
Because the time series of land value is found to contain one unit root while the series of farm income 
is stationary, the present value model is rejected. However, a time series aggregating farm income and 
government  payments  is  found  to  have  a  single  unit  root.  Moreover,  they  find  some  empirical 
evidence suggesting a cointegration relationship between land value and income including subsidies. 
They conclude that farm income alone cannot explain land value. However, considering together farm 
incomes  and  subsidies,  the  present  value  formulation  cannot  be  rejected.  This  could  imply  that 
subsidies are capitalized into farmland value. 
Most studies interested in the explanation of farmland prices also take into account the demand of 
land for alternative uses (residential, recreational, etc.). Generally, the variable intended to capture the 
influence of non-agricultural demand appears to be significant. Goodwin et al. (2005) point out that 
each  additional  inhabitant  per  square  mile  in  a  given  country  adds  $1.85  in  value  to  an  acre  of 
farmland.  A  1% increase  in  the population growth rate  adds $64 per  acre to  the farmland value. 
Plantinga et al. (2002) show that the price of land reflects current as well as potential uses of land. If a 
potential buyer expects a conversion of farmland for a more profitable purpose in a forthcoming year, 
the current land value also reflects a conversion value associated with the future potential use of land. 
The authors show that the importance of that conversion value in farmland value depends upon two 
main factors:  the proximity of large urban area and the availability of farmland. With French data, 
Cavailhès et al. (2003) show a negative relationship between the price of farmland and the distance 
from a central business district (CBD). The price of farmland is the highest the closest to the CBD. 
When the distance to CBD increases, the price of land declines reflecting a decrease in the conversion 
value. At about 40 km from the CBD, the price of farmland becomes independent of the distance. The 
authors conclude that when farmland is so far from a CBD, the value of that farmland in agricultural 
production is the sole determinant of farmland price.   6
3. The Theoretical Model : A Present-Value Model for Farmland Prices 
 
Like for the value of any assets, the classical economic theory suggests that the value of a piece of 
agricultural land should be equal to the present value of all future expected cash flows. The cash flows 
associated with the use of land for agricultural production are called the rents (R), i.e., the income left 
after  subtracting  them  from  revenue  of  all  other  productive  factors  (labour,  capital  and  variable 
inputs). If the price of land is below this fundamental value, buying land allows extra profits. In this 
case, the competition among potential buyers of land is such  that  the  price increases.  We follow 
Goodwin et al. (2002, 2005) and propose an equation explaining the formation of arable land price of 
the following form:   
 
 
    (1) 
 
The actual value of land (Pt) is equal to the discounted expected value of all future expected rents from 
agricultural production (
*
j t R + ). The term rt represents the discount rate, e.g., the rate used by land 
market participants to discount future payments. Interested in estimating the extent to which the CAP 
compensatory  payments  are  capitalized  into  farmland  value,  we  break  the  expected  rent  from 
agricultural production into two components: a first component arising from the sale of the agricultural 
production in the market (MS) and a second component linked to the agricultural support (AS): 
 
 
          (2) 
 
Both functions Et(.) and At(.) represent an expectation formation process for the expected revenue 
arising from the market and from the agricultural support. For example, the term At(ASt+j) is the level 
of agricultural support expected in period t for the period t+j. The terms et and at are respectively the 
discount rates apply to the revenue from the sale to the market and to the agricultural support. In any 
present value model, the weight of any income source depends upon the opportunity cost of capital 
and a factor reflecting the expected variability of that particular income source. Indeed, if the agents 
are  assumed  to  be  risk  averse,  the  anticipated  variability  of  a  future  cash  flow  may  affect  the 
determination of the discount rate of that particular cash flow. If a given source of payment is seen as a 
more variable and/or more temporary, that particular payment takes a smaller weight in the present 
value. Consequently, we define each discount rate as follows: 
 
et = ot + vet 
at = ot + vat 
 
Where the term ot is the opportunity cost of the capital engaged in agriculture in t and the terms vet and 
vat respectively reflect the expected variability of the revenue arising from the sale to the market and 




represents the present value in t of the agricultural support expected for the period t+j. We use a 
distinct  discount  rate  for  each  income  source  to  reflect  that  the  expected  variability  is  payment 
specific. If a given income stream is seen as more variable, it is discounted at a larger rate. We also 
constrain the terms Et(MRt+j) and At(ASt+j) to be constant independently of the period t+j at which the 
payments is expected :  
 
            Et(MRt+j) = Et(MR) 
At(ASt+j) = At(AS) 
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However, to remain as general as possible, we allow the participants to the land market to expect 
increasing (or decreasing) cash flow for each source of payment. For example, if the agricultural 
support is expected to grow at a constant rate gat each year, the present value in period t of a cash flow 
expected for the period t+j is be given by: 
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A similar expression can be obtained if land market participants anticipate increasing (or decreasing) 
revenue from the sale in the market at a constant rate get. With the last modifications, equation 2 
becomes: 
 
  (3) 
 
 
where get and gat are respectively the rate of growth expected in t for the sources of payment Et(MR) 
and At(AS). 
 
Recognising that each integral corresponds to the present value of a perpetual constant flow, equation 





  (4) 
 
where at and bt respectively represent the rate of capitalisation of the expected future revenues arising 
from the sale to the market and the rate of capitalisation of the expected agricultural support. Both 
terms at and bt represent the reciprocal of the corresponding discount factor.  
 
 4. The Econometric Model and Variable Definition 
 
The previous sections suggest a number of factors that may influence the price of arable farmland. 
This section defines the empirical model and the data used to estimate the determinants of arable 
farmland price. The empirical analysis proceeds from equation (5) that is estimated using a balanced 





The PALit, variable is the average sale price of arable land (per hectare) observed in district i during 
year t. The variables EMR and CP are respectively used as indicators of the expected land rent from 
the sales to the market and the land rent from the agricultural support. Due to limitation in available 
data, we choose to approach the realized land rent by the sum of the agricultural family income and 
land costs by hectare. Those data are available in the yearly publications of the Belgian Centre for 
Agricultural Economics. Because the compensatory payments defined hereafter are also a component 
of the agricultural family income, we subtract the variable CP of the realized land rent to obtain the 
land rent arising from sales to the market. Of course, that variable is the current realisation of that 
particular rent and, consequently, it is a wrong indicator of the expected land rent from sales to the 
market. To approach the expected market rent, we follow Goodwin et al. (2005) and construct a four 
year average of that land rent realized during the current and past three years.  
The variable CP is used to approach the level of support for cereals, oilseed and protein crops. 
Because  it  is  impossible  to  obtain  the  realized  payment  per  hectare,  we  choose  to  approach  that 
particular type of support by the following formula:   
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with CP CP v v  
with j = cereals, rapeseed, flax and fallow. The CPjit and areajit variable are respectively the amount of 
support by hectare of crop j and the area of that crop in district i during year t. 
Both variables PDi t-1 and DPRLi t-1 are introduced to control for the expected future capital gains 
inherent in farmland in areas facing non-agricultural pressure. The variable PD is the population 
density per square kilometre. The variable DPRL is the growth rate of the price of residential land. We 
choose to express the price of residential land in growth rate to break a potential multicollinearity 
between PD and PRL since the correlation between PD and PRL is close to 0.7. The variables PAL, 
PD and PRL are directly available in the yearly publications of the Belgian National Institute for 
Statistics (NIS). 
The variable PIG corresponds to the pig density by hectare of agricultural area. The series is 
calculated from the Belgian Agricultural Census (NIS). The pig density is introduced to control for a 
possible capitalization of manure spreading rent in the land market (Le Goffe et al., 2005).  
With  all  variables  presented  above  farmland  price  is  mainly  explained  by  demand  factors: 
agricultural profitability, government support, competing uses for land, etc. However, demand factors 
are the sole determinants of farmland price if and only if farmland supply is perfectly inelastic. We, 
however, hypothesize that the area of farmland entering into the market in a particular place at a 
particular date also plays a role in the explanation of farmland value. In other words, we want to 
control for supply factors explaining farmland price. The variables MS and MA are used to control for 
this supply. The variable MS represents the size of the arable farmland market. It is approached by the 
fraction of arable farmland exchanged in a particular district at a particular year. An increase in MS is 
expected to induce a decrease in the farmland price. The variable MA is the average area of farms in 
the district. This variable MA reflects the pressure of agricultural activities on farmland market. The 
variable MA is expected to yield a negative coefficient. The variables PIG, MA and MS are calculated 
from the Belgian Agricultural Census of NIS.     
To correct for the effect of common inflationary pressure, all monetary variable (PAL, EMR, and 
CP and PRL) are adjusted to 2000 euros using the Gross Domestic Product deflator published in the 
Belgostat database. For the estimation procedure, all variables are transformed into natural logarithm 
to obtain a direct interpretation in terms of elasticity. 
5. Estimation of the Land Price Equation  
 
5.1. Specification Tests and Model selection 
 
Our model of farmland formation presented in equation (5) can be estimated in several ways. The 
appropriate estimation method depends upon the structure of the error terms, uit, and the correlation 
between the observed determinants of farmland prices and the different components of the error term. 
In  what  follows,  we  want  to  determine  the  most  appropriate  estimation  technique.  We  start  by 
assuming a time constant coefficient for both the variable EMR and CP.  
The second column of Table 1 gives the OLS estimation of the farmland price equation. This 
model  assumes  that  all  OLS  assumptions  be  satisfied  and  that  the  parameters  of  the  equation  be 
constant for all time periods and Belgian districts. However, it might be possible that both district-
specific and time-specific unobservable factors affect on farmland price.  In case of such time and/or 
district heterogeneity in the equation explaining the formation of farmland price, OLS estimators are 
biased.  For  that  reason,  the  possibility  of  a  cross-sectional  or  a  time  specific  heterogeneity  is 
considered in the four last columns.  
In the district fixed effect (DFE) model, a dummy variable specific for each district accommodates 
for district heterogeneity. The fifth column of Table 1 presents results from the district random effect 
(DRE) model where the unobserved district effect is included in the error term. This error term is 
decomposed into two components: a cross-sectional specific error (vi) and an individual error (eit). By   9
introducing the individual effects in the error term, we assume that the intercept is a random outcome 
variable. The DRE and DFE models differ by one critical assumption: the DRE model assumes no 
correlation between the cross-sectional effects and the observed regressors. This assumption might be 
critical  for  the  present  study.  Some  unobserved  parameters  specific  to  a  district  that  explain  the 
formation of land price might also have an impact on some independent variables. For example, the 
agro-climatic conditions of a particular district might influence both farmland price and market rent. In 
presence  of  such  correlation,  the  DRE  estimator  is  inconsistent  while  the  DFE  estimator  remains 
consistent. In the absence of such correlation both estimators are, however, consistent, but the DRE 
estimator is more efficient. If we are convinced that the district heterogeneity needs to be taken into 
account, we need to decide whether the DFE or DRE model is the more appropriate (Sevestre, 2002 ; 
Baltagi, 2001).  
In a similar way, the possibility of a time-specific heterogeneity is considered in fourth and sixth 
columns of Table 1. The fourth column presents the results from the time fixed effect (TFE) model, 
which accommodates for time heterogeneity by introducing a dummy variable specific to each time 
series. The sixth column presents the results from the time random effects (TRE) model in which the 
error term accommodates for time unobserved heterogeneity.    
 
Table 1. Estimation results of the farmland price equation (5) using ordinary least squares (OLS), 
time-fixed effect (TFE), district-fixed effect (DFE), time-random effect (TRE) and district-random 
effect (DRE) estimators (Numbers in parentheses are p-value). 
VARIABLE  OLS  DFE  TFE  DRE  TRE 









































































To select the appropriate specification, two questions have to be addressed. First, is there evidence 
of a need to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity and time-effects? If no, we can rely on the OLS 
estimator. Second, if such evidence exists, can we reasonably assume that the random district and/or 
time effect is the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE)?         
To answer the first question, we first test the joint significance of all district effects in the DFE 
model. We perform this joint significance test by a traditional F-test. The value of the statistics is 
28.65. Compared with a F(41, 875) we reject the null hypothesis at more than one percent significance 
level. We now test the need to control for time effects by testing the joint significance of all time 
effects in the TFE model. The value of the statistics is 14.41. Compared with a F(21, 895), we reject 
the null hypothesis. 
The two F-tests indicate the need to accommodate with both unobservable district heterogeneity 
and  unobservable  time  effects.    We  now  have  to  decide  on  whether  a  fixed  or  random  effect 
specification is the more reliable one. For the unobservable time effects, we test the assumption that 
the time specific effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. Under this assumption, we 
choose  the  TRE  model  which  is  consistent  and  more  efficient  than  the  TFE  model.  Under  the 
alternative,  we  choose  the  TFE  model,  which  remains  consistent.  The  former  assumption  is  not 
directly testable. But, Hausman (1978) suggests an indirect test of the null hypothesis. Under the null 
hypothesis, both estimators are consistent and so converge to the same value. If the difference between   10
the two estimators can be considered as systematic, we reject the null hypothesis and prefer to focus 
on the TFE model still consistent under the alternative. The results of the estimations reported in Table 
1 indicates a large difference in some of the coefficients obtained from the TFE and TRE models, a 
sign of failure of the null of no correlation. The value of 41.11 of the Hausman statistics confirms this 
intuition. Under the null hypothesis, this statistics is distributed as a c² with K degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of regressors. Consequently, the Hausman test rejects the null that the difference 
in  coefficients  is  not  systematic  and  we  rely  on  the  results  on  the  TFE  model.  For  the  district 
heterogeneity, the Hausman statistics takes a value of 51.05. Once again, it is a sign of failure of the 
no correlation assumption and we prefer to rely on the results of the DFE model.  
 
5.2 Correction for Heteroskedasticity and Serial Correlation  
 
The specification tests indicate the need to control for both district unobservable heterogeneity and 
unobservable time effects. In both cases, the fixed effect specification seems to be more reliable than 
the random effect specification. For that reason, we present the results of a two-way fixed effect 
model. Moreover, we want to stay as general as possible and allow for the compensatory payment to 





where the regression disturbances, uit,, are assumed to be homoskedastic and uncorrelated. If those 
assumptions are not satisfied, the two-way fixed effect model is still consistent but no more efficient. 
Before to present the estimation results, we test for a possible correlation in the residuals. To test the 
null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation in the residuals, we use the Baltagi-Wu locally best 
invariant test statistics. The statistics is distributed as an N(0,1). To test Ho: r = 0 against Ha: r>0, we 
refer to the lower tail of the normal distribution. If the alternative is r<0, we compare the realisation of 
the statistics with the upper tail critical value of the distribution (Baltagi et al., 1999). The realization 
of the statistics is 1.63. Consequently, we reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the 
residuals. Another test proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982) is the generalization of the Durbin-Watson 
for the fixed effects model. The realisation of the statistics is 1.46. As in the classical Durbin-Watson 
case, the null hypothesis of no correlation in the residuals is rejected if the realisation of the statistics 
is below the lower bound critical value, and is not rejected if the statistics is larger than the upper 
bound critical value. The critical value are reported in Bhargava et al. (1982). As the realisation of the 
statistics is below 1.5, we strongly reject the null of no serial correlation in the residuals. 
The  rejection  of  the  null hypothesis  of  no  serial  correlation indicates  the  need  to  correct  the 
standard errors for serial correlation. Table 2 reports the results of the estimation of the two-way fixed 
effect model using robust standard error. We assume that the disturbance follows an AR(1) process 
with a specific coefficient for each cross-section. To correct for possible heteroskedasticity, we assume 
that each panel has its own variance.    
The estimation results of equation (6) are presented in Table 2. Estimates of the district and time 
dummy variables (generally significant) are not presented here due to space limitation. Table 2 shows 
that the compensatory payments are consistently significant with the correct sign from 1996 to 2001. 
Both variables aimed to represent the supply side are also found to be significant with the expected 
sign. However, the variable EMR plays only a very weak effect on the price of arable farmland. An 
increase in EMR of 1% only induces a increase in farmland price of 0.078 %. Moreover, EMR is only 
significant at 6% significant level. Both variables representing the non-agricultural demand (PDt-1 and 
DPRLt-1 ) are found to be insignificant.  
That PDt-1 and DPRLt-1 are found insignificant and that the coefficient of EMR is low and weakly 
significant do not mean that those variables are not explicative of land price variation. To understand 
the source of these counterintuitive results, the third column of Table 2 presents the estimation results 
of the following equation:  
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(7) 
 
Table 2. Estimation results of the farmland price equations (6), (7) and (8). Prais-Winston regression 
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Equation (7) only differs from equation (6) by removing the district dummies. Estimation results of 
equation (7) show a larger elasticity for the expected land rent from market sales and indicate that the 
population density has an expected and significant effect. That the elasticity of EMR is of smaller size 
in the estimation results of equation (6) indicates that the cross sectional difference across districts 
plays  a  very  important  role  in  explaining  farmland  value.  In  equation  (6),  the  district  dummies 
absorbed most of the cross-sectional effect of the expected land rent from market sales. 
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5.3 Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Non-Stationarity 
 
The classical panel-data estimation method presented upon relies on the assumption that the series are 
stationary. The presence of non-stationarity series could invalidate the results presented above. When 
both dependent and independent variables are trend-dominated, we are very likely to find significant 
coefficient  and  high  R²,  even  in  the  absence  of  causality  between  those  trending  variables.  This 
phenomenon  known  as  the  spurious  correlation  problem  might  explain  the  very  attractive  results 
presented above. We, therefore, examine the order of integration of our series using the panel unit root 
test proposed by Levin et al. (2002) and another similar test proposed by Im et al. (2003). 
In both tests the null hypothesis assumes a unit root in the data generating process. In the Levin et 
al. test, it is assumed that the coefficient of the autoregressive process is common to each cross-
section. In contrast, the Im et al. test allows a specific coefficient for each cross-section. More detailed 
information on the construction of those two tests can be founded in Baltagi (2001, chapter 12). For 
each test, we incorporate an intercept. It is left to decide whether or not it is appropriate to introduce a 
time trend. The inspection of the data indicates to introduce such a trend only for the EMR series. Of 
course, the absence of a significant trend in the series representing land prices mainly reflects that we 
have withdrawn the effect of inflation by working on real term data.  
Table 3 presents the results of the Levin et al. and the Im et al. tests of the null hypothesis of unit 
root process for each variable. Both tests reject the null of non stationarity for the series representing 
the price of arable land, the expected land rent from market sales and the price of compensatory 
payments. That those series are found to be integer of the same order is to be linked with the results of 
the study of Clark et al. (1993). We cannot reject the assumption that the movements in the expected 
land rent from market sales and the compensatory payments explain the movements in land price. For 
the series of PD, PIG  and MA, the Im  et al. test does not allow to safely reject the null of non 
stationarity. 
 
Table 3. Panel unit root tests 
Levin, Lin and Chu  Im, Pesaran and Shin   
Variable  Test statistic  p-value  Test statistic  p-value 
Price of Arable Land (PAL)  -10.27  0.000  -9.73  0.000 
Expected land Rent from the market sales (EMR)  -9.58  0.000  -3.86  0.000 
Compensatory Payment  (CP)  -14.90  0.000  -3.27  0.000 
Population Density (PD)  -2.62  0.004  -0.47  0.31 
Price of residential Land Growth (DPRL)  -7.59  0.000  -11.43  0.000 
Pig Density (PIG)  -3.84  0.001  -1.13  0.12 
Mean Area (MA)  11.09  1  18.11  1 
Market Size (MS)   -5.57  0  -7.23  0 
 
That  three  series  are  non-stationary  could  invalidate  the  results  presented  upon.  However,  by 
forming the linear combination of the PD, PIG and MA series using the estimated coefficient reported 
in Table 2 (third column), we find that the linear combination is stationary. The Levin et al. statistics 
takes a value of –15.18. We can reject the null of non stationarity of the linear combination at more 
than 1% significant level.  This means that the left and right hand sides of equation (7) are balanced. 
Hence, the results of equation (7) presented in Table 2 cannot be invalidated by spurious correlation. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to show that both parts of equation (6) are balanced by a similar 
argument. That both sides of equation (6) are unbalanced makes any inference drawn from the results 
of equation (6) questionable.    13
5.4 Structural Break Test 
 
In what follows, we want to test the assumption that the 1992 CAP reform has caused a structural 
break in the land price equation. We expect to find that the elasticity of the variable EMR is smaller 
after the 1992 reform. The assumption of a decrease in the rate of capitalization of the expected land 
rent from market sales relies on two arguments. First, because of the 1992 reform and the concomitant 
price  cut,  the  CAP  instruments  are  less  able  to  stabilise  agricultural  incomes.  Consequently,  the 
expected land rent from market sales could be expected to be more volatile and, hence, have a larger 
capitalization  factor  attached  to  it.  Second,  the  adoption  of  the  Agreement  on  Agriculture  at  the 
Uruguay Round together with the discussions concerning the future of the CAP instruments indicate 
subsequent price cuts and, hence, subsequent decrease in farm incomes. On the basis of equation (4), 
we can conclude that both a larger anticipated variability of the expected land rent from market sales 
(increase in vet) and an expected decreasing land rent from market sales (get<0 for t>1992) should 
induce a decrease in the rate of capitalization of the expected land rent from market sales.  
To test the existence of a structural break in a given year t, we estimate an extended version of 
equation (7): 
. t q b b t b b ³ + = < = t if and t if where r rt r rt           (8) 
 
Table  2  (fourth  and  fifth  columns)  presents  the  results  of  the  estimation  of  two  versions  of 
equation (8). The fifth column of table 2 shows the estimation results of equation (8) introducing the 
possibility  of  a  structural  break  at  the  first  year  of  the  introduction  of the  reform,  i.e.,1993.  The 
elasticity of EMR is quantitatively smaller in the period succeeding the break. We test the null of 
equality of the EMR elasticity before and after 1993. The statistics of the test takes a value of 1.71. 
Compared with a c² with one degree of freedom, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of elasticity 
equality. The last column of Table 2 shows the estimation results of equation (8) considering the 
possibility of a structural break in 1994. Testing again the assumption of elasticity equality, we find a 
statistics of 5.66. Consequently, we can reject the hypothesis of elasticity equality.  
 
5.5 Regional Effect of the CAP Compensatory Payments 
 
Because the share of arable land planted in crops eligible to direct support (cereals, rapeseeds, flax and 
fallow) is greater in the Belgian region of Wallonia (50%) than in the region of Flanders (29%), we 
check whether or not the elasticity of the CAP compensatory payments have a regional-specific effect. 
We allow for all variables of equation (8) to have a separate effect in each region. Estimation results 
reported  in  Table  4  show  that  the  elasticity  of  farmland  price  to  compensatory  payments  is 
systematically stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders. On the basis of that result, we cannot reject that 
the regional specialisation of agriculture has an impact on the capitalisation rate of direct agricultural 
support. Results in Table 4 also show an increase in the rate of capitalisation of the compensatory 
payments in both regions. Those trends can reflect the expectation of the land market participants. An 
increase in the rate of capitalisation of the compensatory payments could be explained by the belief 
that this type of direct payments will continue in the forthcoming years.  
  
Results in Table 4 also show that the rate of capitalization of the expected land rent from market sales 
remains steady in Flanders. In contrast, we observe a significant change in the rate of capitalization of 
that expected land rent in Wallonia. Before 1994, a 1% increase in the expected land rent from market 
sales leads to a 0.15 % increase in farmland price. Since 1994, the movements in the expected land 
rent from market sales badly explain farmland price movements. Once again this result must be linked 
to the agricultural specialisation in each part of Belgium. Due to its greater agricultural specialisation 
towards farm activities supported by interventionist prices, an important part of the expected land rent 
from market sales arises from the price support in Wallonia. Consequently, the 1992 and forthcoming 
announced intervention price cuts have a stronger impact on the rate of capitalisation of the expected 
land rent from market sales in Wallonia than in Flanders.  
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Table 4. Estimation of equation (8) with t=1994 and allowing a regional specific elasticity for each 
variable.  Prais-Winston  regression  with  panel  corrected  standard  errors  and  AR[1]  disturbances 
(Numbers in parentheses are p-value).  
Variable   Wallonia  Flanders 






































































6. Summary and conclusion 
 
Few  existing  studies  provide  information  on  the  extent  to  which  CAP  support  instruments  are 
capitalized into farmland sale price. In this study, we estimate the effect of the CAP 1992 reform on 
the price of arable land in Belgium. Indeed, after a long period of declining prices, the real price of 
arable farmland increased at a yearly average of 3.8% during the 1995-2001 period. The CAP 1992 
and subsequent reform also correspond to an important inflexion of the CAP support instruments. 
Starting from an intervention system largely based on the price support, the CAP progressively shifts 
to  direct  payments  partially  decoupled  from  production.  However,  economic  theory  suggests  that 
farmland prices also reflect direct agricultural support.   
Using a panel of 42 Belgian districts from 1980 to 2001, we first observed that the exchange price 
of  arable  farmland is affected by the compensatory  payments.  Depending on the year and  region 
considered, the elasticity of arable farmland price to compensatory payments ranges from 0.12 to 0.47. 
Those parameters are in the same range of those found by other studies like, for example, Goodwin et 
al. (1992) and Barnard et al. (1997). This result also indicates that, by creating a rent that capitalizes   15
into land value, the new CAP instruments also benefit to landowners. Because about two thirds of the 
Belgian  agricultural  land  are  rented  by  farmers,  non-operators  capture  an  important  share  of  the 
agricultural direct support. Our results also indicate that a temporal variability exists in the elasticity of 
arable farmland value to compensatory payments. We show that the sensitivity of arable farmland 
values to compensatory payments increases during the 1993-2001 period.  
All results obtained from the time fixed effect model show that, besides the time dummies and 
other control variables, the expected land rent from market sales exert an important effect on arable 
farmland price. Moreover, because results reported in Table 2 prevent to reject the presence of a 
structural  break  in  the  period  subsequent  to  the  CAP  1992  reform,  we  can  conclude  that  the 
intervention  price  cut  induced  by  the  1992  CAP  reform  conducts  to  a  decrease  in  the  rate  of 
capitalisation of the expected land rent from market sales. Before the reform, an 1% increase in the 
expected  land  rent  from  market  sales  induces  a  farmland  price  increase  of  0.24%.  In  the  years 
following the reform, the farmland price elasticity declines to a value of 0.18%. Results from Table 4 
also show that the sensitivity of arable farmland price to both expected land rent from market sales and 
compensatory payments is region specific. The elasticity of farmland price to compensatory payments 
is much stronger in Wallonia than in Flanders. Second, the decrease in the capitalization rate of the 
expected land rent from market sales is mostly attributable to a decrease in the capitalisation rate in 
Wallonia. 
The comparison of the results of the two-way and one-way time effect models drawn from Table 2 
provides us another important information concerning the determinants of farmland prices. The one-
way time model gives a stronger and more significant elasticity of farmland prices to expected land 
rents from market sales than the two-way fixed effect model. To understand this, we need to consider 
that our measured expected land rent from market sales has two components. The first component is a 
strictly  structural  and time-invariant  component.  The  second  one  is  a  transitory  and  time  varying 
component. In the two-way fixed effect model, the district dummies absorb the structural component 
of  the  expected  land  rent  from  market  sales.  In  contrast,  in  the  one-way  fixed  effect  model,  the 
elasticity of farmland price to the expected land rent from market sales totally reflects the structural 
component. As a result, we can conclude that the structural determinants of the expected land rent 
from market sales are the sole determinants of farmland prices. Farmland price is insensitive to short-
run expected rent fluctuations. This result is coherent with the theory stating that long-run expectations 
of rents are the true determinants of current land prices. Since our sample covers only 20 years, the 
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